Animal Rights and the Question of Sheer Existence
These pheasants wouldn’t have been here at all if we hadn’t bred them.
—James Mason, as Sir Randolph Nettleby, to John Gielgud, as Cornelius Cardew, in the 1985 film “The Shooting Party”
In the June 27, 2011 issue of The Weekly Standard, Matthew Scully reviews The Story of “Charlotte’s Web,” a book about the composition of E. B. White’s children’s classic. Matthew uses the review to argue for animal rights.
Wilbur [a pig, a central character in “Charlotte’s Web”], upon learning what farmer Arable has planned for him, says “Stop! I don’t want to die! Save me, somebody!” A noted apologist for factory farming insists it’s not cruel to confine pigs in small cages for their entire existence because “these animals have never been in natural settings and so cannot know what they are missing.” Which of these accounts of how pigs feel is more disconnected from reality? Wilbur, at least, inhabits a recognizable universe in which living creatures seek comfort, dread death, and cry out in fear….By contrast, to conceive of millions of pigs living in misery but unaware of “what they are missing,” creatures who suffer but don’t even know it, is pure make-believe.
An old friend and a former speechwriter for President George W. Bush, Matthew is the author of the best argument for animal rights of which I’m aware, the eloquent, moving book Dominion: The Power of Man, the Suffering of Animals, and the Call to Mercy.
I’ve always been sympathetic to Matthew’s argument—and always unable to accept it. At least not entirely. A simple question prevents me from doing so--simple, but, I've found, remarkably difficult: How much should we value sheer existence?
In the splendid 1985 film “The Shooting Party,” James Mason sums up the question neatly,observing to John Gielgud, an animal rights protester who is attempting to disrupt a shooting party of British aristocrats, “These pheasants, of course, wouldn’t have been here at all if we hadn’t bred them, hatched them [and] reared them.” If pheasant hunts were abolished, in other words, pheasants wouldn’t flourish. They would cease to exist.
Likewise “Charlotte’s Web.” The little pig may have been bred for ham and bacon. But to wish for a world of vegetarians is not to wish that Wilbur could have led his life in peace. It is to wish that Wilbur had never existed. Likewise, too, come to think of it, another children’s classic that Matthew mentions, “The Story of Ferdinand.” To wish for a world without bullfighting is not to wish that Ferdinand might have been left along to sit peacefully under trees smelling flowers. It is to wish for the extinction of a particular kind of creature, the magnificent Spanish fighting bull. It is to wish Ferdinand not a peaceful existence but no existence.
Bred to be slaughtered, pigs nevertheless live. Raised to enter the corrida and die, fighting bulls are nevertheless born.
Is it better for an animal to die a violent death than never to have existed? I'm unsure of the answer, and in any event it may vary from case to case. (How violent a death did the animal meet? And what quality of life did it experience beforehand? Was it raised to roam, like the bull or the pheasant, or penned in a factory farm, like pigs?) But any way you frame it, the question, as I say, strikes me as difficult.
You?
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May '11
Re: Animal Rights and the Question of Sheer Existence
As far as bullfights go, the bull gets eaten, as would any cattle. How they die is kind of pointless, but if I were a bull I'd take the arena and the chance to fight back, however remote the possibility of being spared, over a bolt gun to the brain any day.
Jul '10
Re: Animal Rights and the Question of Sheer Existence
When given the opportunity to spend a buck more for a product of more humane conditions than factory farms allow, I spend the buck. I have spent time on family farms and have no illusions with regard to what happens in the end, but cruelty was never the intent nor the practice.
Given the trends in meat prices of late, one begins to suspect the animals were lounging at the Fountainbleu awaiting their sauna and massage when they were paged to the abattoir.
Edited on Jun 25, 2011 at 11:03pmJun '10
Re: Animal Rights and the Question of Sheer Existence
Our existence is long but seems short for we are aware of our end. An animal's existence is short but must to it seem long for it is never aware that existence will end. To an animal cruelty is more important than death. It is never wise to stray too far from who we really are, nor is it wise to anthropomorphize and thereby make something into that which it is not.
Edited on Jun 25, 2011 at 11:02pmAug '10
Re: Animal Rights and the Question of Sheer Existence
I have great respect for Matthew. He is a kind and noble man for whom I have the greatest respect. His arguments haven't turned me into a Vegetarian, but they definitely make one consider how one should behave regarding one's carnivorous actions.
I think that we should be facing the moral implications of our actions in killing animals for food. That doesn't mean that I don't think we should do it, but it does mean it isn't something we should do without contemplation. It is wrong to anthropomorphize animals, but it is equally wrong to ignore discussions of the value of life.
Using "Charlotte's Web" -- or BABE for that matter -- is stealing some rhetorical bases, but so is thinking that meat comes from prepackaged bags.
Aug '10
Re: Animal Rights and the Question of Sheer Existence
As Bjorn Lomborg is fond of saying, if we give nature rights, who really ends up getting those rights? That is, who will speak for the pine trees and the penguins, since they cannot speak for themselves? The answer is, other humans, humans who have their own interests and agendas.
So animal rights are a no-go.
That said, our calling as human beings is to be good and kind stewards whenever we can. And to that end, I agree with Cas: animal cruelty is worse than animal death.
Feb '11
Re: Animal Rights and the Question of Sheer Existence
As I explained to my younger daughter twenty-odd years ago, the highest calling of that particular chicken was to be slaughtered by a kosher butcher, to be served at our Sabbath table, to have a blessing recited over it and to be eaten in a civilized manner as part of our festive meal. For this it was bred.
It's not like we interrupted its full and active chicken-life (as my fourteen year old says "maybe it had plans for the weekend"). Nor did we pounce on it like some kind of savages, ripping it apart it without respect for its/our Creator.
Never for the fun of the shoot.
Edited on Jun 25, 2011 at 11:54pmJun '10
Re: Animal Rights and the Question of Sheer Existence
I'd like to quibble just a bit, if I may. Most domesticated animals (minus caged chickens, though they'll try mightily) will go feral if given half a chance. Hogs, for instance, a non-native species, are taking over whitetail and mule deer range all across the country to such an extent that they're classified as pests and thus can be hunted all year long. Ring-necked pheasants, native to China, were accidentally introduced here in the States in 1881 and now have a range from Oklahoma to Alberta. Feral mustangs, descended from colonial Spanish stock, numbered in the millions by 1900. The will to live is almost inextinguishable, the adaptability of God's creatures simply wondrous. We should respect that.
I know that you're a busy man, but if you can squeeze it in this summer The Omnivore's Dilemma by Michael Pollan is a thoughtful and comprehensive look at the moral ramifications of our modern eating habits. If the NYT "10 Best" stamp doesn't pull you in (ha!), the book was winner of the James Beard Award. It's really very good.
May '11
Re: Animal Rights and the Question of Sheer Existence
It is better to have loved and lost than never to have loved at all.
It is better to have lived and discussed what animals experience in human terms than never to have anthropomorphized at all.
Now, then; what we are certain animals experience is comfort or discomfort; it's observable. Comfort for an animal would be to eat regularly, have water, a place to get in out of the rain, that sort of thing. Discomfort would be hunger, pain, thirst, no shelter from rain, snow, sun.
But existential angst? To wit, "What is my purpose as a porpoise?" "Is life worth living if you have to live it 9 times?" "How can anyone expect me to be a good doggie? Hell, I was born in a puppy mill!" That sort of thing.
And finally, imagine if you will the sadly extinct Dodo Bird. Ruing the day it wasn't born. That is some powerful non-existential angst.
May '10
Re: Animal Rights and the Question of Sheer Existence
It's an unavoidable fact that life is based on killing and eating. It is our lot as people who can think in abstractions to reconcile ourselves to this seemingly sinful state of affairs.
A good book on the subject is "Dominion - The Power of Man, the Suffering of Animals, and the Call to Mercy" by Matthew Scully.
Dec '10
Re: Animal Rights and the Question of Sheer Existence
Having farmed hogs in my youth, you will not catch me waxing whimsical about pig-dom while I debate whether or not I should have a bacon sandwich.
They are amusing to watch for about fifteen minutes, then the novelty goes away.
The stench and foul temperament, however, do not.
They are a lower life form, like cows, and sheep, and chickens, and probably moose too.
They don't have plans or grand works or any kind of higher existence. They function by reacting on instinct to whatever occurs around them.
Hogs do not write poetry and ponder the meaning of life. They take a dump in their water trough and then immediately turn around and get a drink.
They're not exactly getting flayed alive at the slaughter house either. A quick shot with a bolt stunner is a pretty painless way to go.
And it's not like they know it's coming. There's no dread or anticipation. They're pointed at the chute, and the guy in front is going in, so they do to. Hogs ain't deep thinkers. They're not all in line in the chutes fretting about what's happening up front.
Mar '11
Re: Animal Rights and the Question of Sheer Existence
MFR: Like the Bjorn Lomborg reference. Exactly right, and concur with you and Cas on stewardship and cruelty. We're animals too, after all.
Peter: The question "How much should we value sheer existence" has some very dark implications, especially for political systems premised on the metaphysical equality of their citizens. If you had asked me whether you should ask that question aloud prior to having done so, I would have cautioned against it. Thankfully, I think we can reach a sound moral judgment on animal treatment without having to answer it in full.
Nov '10
Re: Animal Rights and the Question of Sheer Existence
MFR, I wholeheartedly agree that giving nature rights is dangerous--indeed, virulently anti-human. But is your argument sound as it stands? Consider this modification:
"Suppose we give unborn and baby humans rights. Who will speak for them, given they cannot (yet) speak for themselves? Other humans, of course, with their own agendas. Hence, unborn and baby rights are a no-go."
My intuition therefore suggests that inarticulacy is not a sufficient condition for denying rights.
Does the "(yet)" make a crucial difference? Are human rights grandfathered back in time? I wonder. Suppose I have a beloved newly-born. In 3 months, an cataclsymic asteroid impact will certainly destroy all life on earth. Hence, the baby will never speak for itself. Does it not retain the right to life before the asteroid strikes? Of course! But that has nothing to do with its potential to articulate its own rights.
Midget Faded Rattlesnake: ...f we give nature rights, who really ends up getting those rights? [...] who will speak for the pine trees and the penguins, since they cannot speak for themselves? The answer is, other humans, humans who have their own interests and agendas.
So animal rights are a no-go.
Nov '10
Re: Animal Rights and the Question of Sheer Existence
I)
Peter, let's start at a level lower than animals.
Take a pretty wild flower. Does its existence have value? If so, why?
Suppose I stamp on it and destroy it. Is that now bad? If so, why?
Certainly, it's all the same to the flower. It has no interests. Plus there are plenty of other wild flowers left of the same type. So it hardly seems intrinsically bad.
Yet it might be extrinsically bad. For one thing, it shows I have callous attitude. Possessing and acting upon this attitude might be bad per se, even if there were no objective harm done.
Now, by way of comparison, replace that flower successively with a puppy, chimp, baby human, and adult human. Assume that each one is dispatched cleanly, neither foreseeing the killing nor suffering during it.
My intuition is that the extrinisic wrong escalates as one moves up the scale. First, the callousness increases. Second, the level of hurt caused to others who value the organism killed increases.
My intuition is also that the intrinsic wrong also escalates as one moves up the scale. Maybe flowers don't matter in themselves, but adult humans surely do. Why?
Nov '10
Re: Animal Rights and the Question of Sheer Existence
II)
One plausible answer is that puppies, chimps, baby humans, and adult humans have interests of increasing value--unlike the insensate flower.
Interests can be defined as desires for things to be a certain way, implicitly or explicitly.
It is having these interests that confers increasing intrinsic value upon them. On this view, the more sophisticated and conscious an organism is (or could become-- but see my reply to MFR), the more valuable its interests, and the greater its intrinsic value.
But there are problems with this view.
Suppose X is one of the four categories above.
If X exists now, it has interests: if X does not exist now, it has none. While X lives, its interests can be satisfied or unsatisfied. Before or after X lives, the question does not even arise.
It might seem that killing X is the ultimate failure to satisfy, either all of X's interests, or one key interest in particular, namely, X's desire to continue to live.
(Perhaps only adult humans have this desire explicitly; but the rest,, including baby humans, have it at least implicitly.)
But is this the right way to construe the matter?
Edited on Jun 26, 2011 at 3:58amSep '10
Re: Animal Rights and the Question of Sheer Existence
When the Michael Vick scandal over dog fighting broke I heard a woman from PETA talking about the pit bulls that had been rescued from his farm. She said they had been placed in homes and that, of course, they have to be put down but at least they'd die in someone's loving arms instead of fighting. I nearly gagged since I assumed the dogs had been bred to sort of "want" to die fighting but I don't know really. Happily I have since heard that the dogs were saved and not put down by PETA wackos but the question remains, like the fighting bull, is it cuel to breed animals to fight and let them fight? I agree with the idea that we should not anthropomorphize but that we should not be cruel either.
Edited on Jun 26, 2011 at 4:03amNov '10
Re: Animal Rights and the Question of Sheer Existence
III)
To assert that killing X entails the ultimate failure to satisfy, either all of X's interests, or X's desire to continue to live, may be incoherent.
Suppose you want a glass of milk. I bring you one, or I do not. Your interest is thereby satisfied or not.
But this is only because you continue to exist. If you died while I was prepared the milk, there would exist no interest to be satisfied or not. You would not be around to have any interest in the milk.
Similarly, once you have been killed, there are no interests left to satisfy or not, and no goodness or badness supervening upon those interests being satisfied or not.
But you object: it's the failure to satisfy interests X once had that makes it bad. X wanted to live. X was killed. That was not in X's interest.
But there is a rejoinder: for how long was X's interest unsatisfied?
While he lived, X's interest was satisifed. Once dead, the question no longer arises. So X's interest was unsatisfied only at the moment of death: a vanishingly--perhaps infinitely--short instant.
Edited on Jun 26, 2011 at 5:02amOct '10
Re: Animal Rights and the Question of Sheer Existence
'Greater consciousness' is a common New-agey justification for vegetarianism and animal rights. I've never heard anyone condemn animals for eating each other, but it's asserted that we, with our higher consciousness of right and wrong and awareness of suffering, should know better. This straight from Hindu and Buddhist orthodoxy. I think this probably accounts for most of the thinking of the vast majority of western animal-rights activists.
I don't have the inclination (or time, even on this Sunday morning) to wade deeper into this swamp, but I would like to point out that Ratty and Mole (let's not bring the disreputable Toad into this) enjoyed ham and bacon. And no creature is more thoughtful, considerate or generally higher on the consciousness-scale than the estimable Mole.
Nov '10
Re: Animal Rights and the Question of Sheer Existence
IV)
Let me come full circle.
I have questioned this idea: that killing a living being is wrong because it possesses an intrinsic value deriving from its having interests proportional to its level of psychological sophistication.
Living beings might still derive intrinsic value from elsewhere. Perhaps God decrees their value. Or pehaps other natural properties assure it.
The issue goes to your original question, Peter, of whether the existence of a living being has value per se.
Does that value derive from a living being's intrinsic properties? I have contended there are problems with this view, insofar as interests serve as justificatory framework.
I now submit a radical view for consideration: the existence of a living being may sometimes derive its value exclusively from extrinsic considerations.
Now, this view might even seem antithetical to conservative morals. For one thing, "extrinsic" might be thought to equate chillingly to "subjective".
To the contrary: I believe some things are bad both extrinsically and objectively, and this view can help to justify conserative morals.
Take crushing a flower or aborting a fetus. Both organisms are insensate. The intrinsic wrong is hence debatable. But one can still argue both are extrinsically and objectively wrong.
Edited on Jun 26, 2011 at 5:18amNov '10
Re: Animal Rights and the Question of Sheer Existence
Severly, that's a slightly different, but still interesting, point. It concerns what, given your bigger brain, your responsibilities are, rather your rights.
One can debate the appropriateness of using the term "rights" with animals. But it's bad to mistreat them. What decent person doesn't think so?
Severely Ltd.
'Greater consciousness' is a common New-agey justification for vegetarianism and animal rights. [SNIP]. And no creature is more thoughtful, considerate or generally higher on the consciousness-scale than the estimable Mole. · Jun 26 at 5:00am
Mar '11
Re: Animal Rights and the Question of Sheer Existence
The value of existence is tied to the duration of existence. Is it only in the here and now or is there something that endures beyond this life, i.e. a soul? Is it momentary or eternal? If what we are ends with our mortal death then existence has absolutely no meaning whether for a flower or a flower child.