Byron Horatio · March 19, 2012 at 12:50am

I've discussed at length my religious views in the past on Ricochet.  To sum it up, I'm a secular agnostic and conservative.  I have no hostility towards religion, though cannot bring myself to believe in any particular religion or deity.  

On one theoretical issue though, I am torn: Does there exist or can there exist a secular basis for objective morality?  

In my own life, I operate under the assumption that there is objective morality.  Rape, murder, abuse, are absolutely wrong and must be severely punished.  But on a philosophical level, what is the objective basis for believing these things are wrong?  I concede that I am incapable of producing one.  However, as a secularist, I must act as though there is.  Does that make sense?

In other words, good religion has a utilitarian and perhaps even evolutionary purpose.  Society can exist fine with non-religious individuals, but a non-religious society with no objective basis for morality is doomed to all sorts of evils.  

  

Comments:


Mack The Mike
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Sep '10
Mack The Mike

Midget Faded Rattlesnake

I don't think inquiry is finite. There are always more questions to ask, something more to know. But yes, I think that in a discourse on any particular topic at any particular time, there comes a point where further questions become unanswerable by reason

Sure.  That's when you go out and make more observations.  I certainly don't claim that one can figure it all out using unaided reason alone without making observations.  This is true of Moral Science just as it is with Physics or Biology or any other science.

Edited on March 28, 2012 at 4:12am
Midget Faded Rattlesnake
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Midget Faded Rattlesnake

Mack The Mike

Midget Faded Rattlesnake

An observation, though, may be an impression, a thing you notice but cannot logically justify.

Not just "may be."  Always.  Observations are never logically justifiable.  Observations are just taken as is.  They may be discounted after the fact, but never because they are illogical.

I observe you're probably using a more rigorous definition of observation than I am :-)

Since most of my training is in math, I'm used to thinking of the patterns we notice with the hope of later proving them true as observations, too. These aren't, of course, real physical observations at all, but it occurs to me that physicists sometimes make similar "observations" during the course of thought-experiments.

I do question, though, whether observations are never discounted on the basis of being illogical. Polanyi said, "The process of explaining away deviations is in fact quite indispensable to the daily routine of research. In my laboratory I find the laws of nature formally contradicted at every hour." So physical observations are often discounted for failing to conform to the logic of established theory. It's only when the observations are judged "significant" that the theory is questioned instead.

Edited on March 28, 2012 at 7:52am
Mark Wilson
Joined
May '10
Mark Wilson

Midget Faded Rattlesnake

For instance, philosophies that espouse the will to power as their guiding principle -- that "might makes right" or "the truth is what we will it to be" --have  had a practical impact on the world, for example, in the form of totalitarianism.  I believe fascism in particular made much of truth being what is imposed by the will, rather than it being an independent (though elusive) entity that the will eventually submits to, willingly or unwillingly.

I'm not advocating might makes right as a fundamental principle for morality.  I'm merely stating that it is the operational basis for cultural consensus-enforced morality.  I use the word "might" in this instance not to mean acute power of coercion by a small group, but to mean overwhelming consensus which ostracizes immoral behavior and is not swayed by a few immoral individuals.  Its moral authority in practice derives from the overwhelming consensus.

Mark Wilson
Joined
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Mark Wilson

Mack The Mike

The reason, in short, is that moral reasoning makes people better.  People who don't question their own beliefs can have stunted character development and become selfish, thoughtless people.  In extreme cases such a person could become, well, an extremist.  From what I can gleen from press accounts and interviews, terrorists don't spend much effort questioning what's right and wrong.  But even leaving the extremes aside, a person who sees no benefit from moral reasoning will also see no possibility of convincing others through reason.  So if a conflict arises, such a person will have no motive not to attempt to resolve the conflict through deception or violence.

I agree wholeheartedly with this line of reasoning.  I promote the idea that the words I bolded above are Bad Things.  But I think apart from appealing a divine law to  tell us so, the people who believe those are bad things do so out of instinct, which is to say, out of deeply seated emotional tendencies to prefer peace, comfort, camaraderie, magnanimity, respect, honesty, etc., preferences which have historically positive consequences for our species in terms of population, quality and length of life.

Edited on March 28, 2012 at 8:08am
Mark Wilson
Joined
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Mark Wilson

(continued)

And it is a wonderful fact of our divine creation or our naturally-selected evolution that has instilled such a widespread set of basic preferences for right and wrong.  But as with any large, diverse population, there are outliers--people who don't value those common things that the rest of us base our consensus morality on.  This perhapsis often caused by narcissism, or many other forms of evil (either "absolute evil" or "what we would consider evil")

I think that without the ability to appeal to a greater authority on right and wrong, all you can do in response to these people is attempt to reason with them based on the projected consequences of their rejection of the common morality.  And if they reject your premises of "common human instinctual desires that benefit the species", you cannot say they are objectively in the wrong. 

In order to do so we require a higher authority who can define the premises and/or conclusions.

Midget Faded Rattlesnake
Joined
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Midget Faded Rattlesnake

Mark Wilson

I use the word "might" in this instance not to mean acute power of coercion by a small group, but to mean overwhelming consensus which ostracizes immoral behavior and is not swayed by a few immoral individuals.  Its moral authority in practice derives from the overwhelming consensus.

I guessed this is what you might have meant, but "might makes right" is such a loaded phrase that I really had to say something.

Yes, morality is enforced by consensus, so "morality = whatever our consensus says it is" is a reasonable operational definition. But there are so many problems with making a definition so utterly lacking in the self-examination necessary to develop moral maturity the  normative  definition of morality, and so many people are bad at disentangling the normative from the operational, that I see dangers in overemphasizing such an operational definition.

"Rights = whatever can be defended in a court of law" is perhaps a decent operational definition of rights. It explains why, for example, inarticulate categories of creatures (animals, vegetables) cannot have rights -- they cannot speak for themselves, and who can be trusted to speak for them? But it's still an inadequate definition of rights.

Edited on March 28, 2012 at 8:49am
Midget Faded Rattlesnake
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Midget Faded Rattlesnake

Mark Wilson:

I think that without the ability to appeal to a greater authority on right and wrong, all you can do in response to these people is attempt to reason with them based on the projected consequences of their rejection of the common morality. 

That's all you can do if you stick to reasoning about observations they will assent to.

But... you  could  try wooing them with another story -- a "better" story. Another vision. You wouldn't command their assent to this vision through the authority of reason, but perhaps you might introduce them to the beauties of a new moral landscape.

I'm merely stating that it is the operational basis for cultural consensus-enforced morality...

...And if they reject your premises of "common human instinctual desires that benefit the species", you cannot say they are objectively in the wrong. 

You can't say it even if the weight of common observation is on your side? But suppose it isn't.

Suppose the operational definition of morality is the best we can do. It's still inadequate. We crave more, even if we cannot get it. That's an observation I think most people could assent to.

Mark Wilson
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Mark Wilson

Midget Faded Rattlesnake

But it's still an inadequate definition of rights. · 15 hours ago

As I would agree the definition of objective morality without divine authority is also inadequate.

Midget Faded Rattlesnake

But... you could  try wooing them with another story -- a "better" story. Another vision. You wouldn't command their assent to this vision through the authority of reason, but perhaps you might introduce them to the beauties of a new moral landscape.

Such an approach may be more successful, but I don't see that it gains any objectivity.  It's an appeal to beauty.

Midget Faded Rattlesnake

'm merely stating that it is the operational basis for cultural consensus-enforced morality...

...And if they reject your premises of "common human instinctual desires that benefit the species", you cannot say they are objectively in the wrong. 

You can't say it even if the weight of common observation is on your side?

I'm saying that a person rejects "benefit to the species" as being objectively good, not that the person rejects evidence demonstrating such.

Midget Faded Rattlesnake
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Midget Faded Rattlesnake

Mark Wilson

Midget Faded Rattlesnake

But... you could  try wooing them with another story... You wouldn't command their assent to this vision through the authority of reason, but perhaps you might introduce them to the beauties of a new moral landscape.

Such an approach may be more successful, but I don't see that it gains any objectivity.  It's an appeal to beauty.

Of course it's not a gain in objectivity (at least not objectivity in the impersonally verifiable sense). As you say, it's an appeal to beauty.

My point was that there are more ways to respond to people's rejection of moral premises than to

Mark Wilson:

attempt to reason with them based on the projected consequences of their rejection of the common morality. 

Midget Faded Rattlesnake
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Midget Faded Rattlesnake

We are aesthetic beings. Presupposing an objectively ordered reality appeals to our aesthetic sense, too.

Even people who reject the moral authority of an Almighty may choose to believe in an external moral order simply on the grounds that it is aesthetically satisfying to do so.

Keats was wrong:

'Beauty is truth, truth beauty,—that is all

 

    Ye know on earth, and all ye need to know.'

There's a lot more we need know on earth than that. On the other hand, if there's  no  connection between truth and beauty, how can truth attract us?

And if  -- if -- beauty regularly inspires us to better orient ourselves to external reality, then there  is  a connection between beauty and objectivity (in the "oriented towards external reality" sense of the word).

(My personal experience is that my desire to orient myself towards some external reality is strongly fueled by aesthetics -- something I suspect is rather common, at least among people with an interest in science.)

Mark Wilson
Joined
May '10
Mark Wilson

I really like your last post. 

Maybe I have been operating under a false assumption.  You and Mack seemed to both say that morality is objective regardless of a divine authority, merely because we are capable of reasoning about it.  I took that to mean that you think the answer to the original post question is "yes", so I have been trying to pose my arguments against that and get your response.  Have I been mistaken?

Mack The Mike
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Mack The Mike

Midget Faded Rattlesnake

Mark Wilson

Such an approach may be more successful, but I don't see that it gains any objectivity.  It's an appeal to beauty.

Of course it's not a gain in objectivity (at least not objectivity in the impersonally verifiable sense). As you say, it's an appeal to beauty.

While I've foresworn the use of the term 'objectivity' for the duration of this thread, let me just say that I think Beauty is impersonally verifiable in the same sense as scientific Truth and Goodness are.  Statements asserting (or denying) beauty are truth-apt and their truth does not depend on the peculiarities or acts of will of individuals.

Mack The Mike
Joined
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Mack The Mike

Midget Faded Rattlesnake

Yes, morality is enforced by consensus, so "morality = whatever our consensus says it is" is a reasonable operational definition.

Ah, there's the nub. It's that 'whatever' that I really object to.  That 'whatever' establishes a hard stop to the conversation about right and wrong.  It asserts authority.  It says that an act's morality is defined by some person's (or group's) act of will. "It's right because I say so and morality is whatever I say."  This stands in contrast to the way we approach empirical questions.  Science operates under an assumption of falliblism.  Theories are always held provisionally.  Science is always ready to to modify or reject any of it's ideas.  Science can be self-correcting because it can change.  That's its strength.

 But a direct appeal to authority doesn't have this strength.  If people believe that definition of right and wrong and come into conflict with each other, then there can be no recourse to reason.  All that's left are manipulation, deception, and violence.

Mack The Mike
Joined
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Mack The Mike

Mark Wilson: (continued)

And it is a wonderful fact of our divine creation or our naturally-selected evolution that has instilled such a widespread set of basic preferences for right and wrong.

"Or"?  Surely you meant "and."

Mack The Mike
Joined
Sep '10
Mack The Mike
Mark Wilson: But as with any large, diverse population, there are outliers--people who don't value those common things that the rest of us base our consensus morality on.

I think you put the cart before the horse.  Morality doesn't come from what we value, rather what we value comes from our beliefs about morality.  Some people do value the wrong things, but that doesn't stop those things from being wrong.  We should value what is good for us.  What's good for us is a function of our nature.  Our nature is what it is regardless of our opinions of it.  A person may well value the pleasure they get from heroine, that doesn't make drug abuse healthy for them.

Discerning right from wrong isn't a matter of taking a poll.  If you encounter a person who values very different things than most people, don't assume that the difference is necessarily due to narcissism.  Mother Theressa valued different things than most of us.  The right question to ask is whether those values led her to live a life that realized more of less of the full human potential.

Midget Faded Rattlesnake
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Midget Faded Rattlesnake

Mack The Mike

Mark Wilson: (continued)

And it is a wonderful fact of our divine creationorour naturally-selected evolution that has instilled such a widespread set of basic preferences for right and wrong.

"Or"?  Surely you meant "and." 

If he's using the definition of and and or found in formal logic (used by mathematicians, computer scientists, etc) then and means "both" (intersection) and or means "either one or both" (union).

Since Mark's an engineer, I assumed he meant the definition I described, and the sentence made sense to me when I read it.

Mack The Mike
Joined
Sep '10
Mack The Mike

Mark Wilson:

I think that without the ability to appeal to a greater authority on right and wrong, all you can do in response to these people is attempt to reason with them based on the projected consequences of their rejection of the common morality.  And if they reject your premises of "common human instinctual desires that benefit the species", you cannot say they are objectively in the wrong. 

In order to do so we require a higher authority who can define the premises and/or conclusions.

I'm not sure who you are quoting above.  I don't know anyone who thinks humans have an instinct to benefit the species.  I certainly don't.

I note that there is a planted assumption in your argument. You say we can appeal to someone "based on the projected consequences of their" actions.  But that presupposes that they prefer some consequences to others.  Well why is that? I put it to you that people prefer some consequences to others because it is human nature to do so.  And that's the beginning of a conversation that goes beyond what any person chooses arbitrarily to accept or reject.  That conversation is moral reasoning.

Mack The Mike
Joined
Sep '10
Mack The Mike

Mark Wilson: I really like your last post. 

Maybe I have been operating under a false assumption.  You and Mack seemed to both say that morality is objective regardless of a divine authority, merely because we are capable of reasoning about it.  I took that to mean that you think the answer to the original post question is "yes", so I have been trying to pose my arguments against that and get your response.  Have I been mistaken?

Not about me.  I do think moral truths are discoverable without divine revelation.

Midget Faded Rattlesnake
Joined
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Midget Faded Rattlesnake

Mack The Mike

Midget Faded Rattlesnake

Yes, morality is enforced by consensus, so "morality =whateverour consensus says it is" is a reasonable operational definition.

Ah, there's the nub. It's that 'whatever' that I really object to.

I am not a huge fan of the operational definition of morality myself for the same reason. Because if you mistake it for a normative definition, you're sure in trouble!

Mack The Mike

This stands in contrast to the way we approach empirical questions.

Well, yes... And... er... also no, a little:

A great leap forward in science occurred when somebody decided to declare that time was whatever a clock measured. That parallels the operational definition of morality pretty closely.

Mack The Mike

Science can be self-correcting because it can change. 

A population's moral consensus can change over time, too, though.

But I think Mark and I have tried to make it clear that we don't want that operational definition of morality to be the normative definition. The operational definition of morality is inadequate for morality.

Midget Faded Rattlesnake
Joined
Aug '10
Midget Faded Rattlesnake

Mack The Mike

A person may well value the pleasure they get from heroine...

Many a hero values the pleasure he gets from his heroine ;-)


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