I haven't read the studies, but I am guessing that one problem is the way we currently define "happiness."  If happiness is the state of immediate gratification of one's own desires, then of course children won't make you "happy."  And when I say "you," I mean me (father of two).   But if we use happiness to refer to a deeper sort of satisfaction, then I think the answer is different.   Some of the previous comments point in the same direction - like Spin, who phrased it in terms of significance.  

I side with Thomas (as I said in my earlier post -- beat you to it, John!). 

There appears to be solid evidence that the "times, places, and manner" clause was intended to guard against the dangers that states would either fail to schedule federal elections, or would somehow discourage people from participating.  There does not appear to be evidence that the Founders viewed the "times, places, and manner" clause as giving the Feds the power to pre-empt states' rights over voter qualification.  Granted, one has to extrapolate a bit, because voter registration was not a very formal process in 1789, but the states managed the processes by which voters established their qualification to vote.

I'm not a founder, but I was one of the first contributors and am incredibly proud of what we have built together (oh wait - we didn't built that, the government did).  I'll never forget the early days of the site, when the camaraderie was just what the doctor ordered to overcome my post-2008 election blues.  

Ricochet has stiffened my spine and sharpened my writing.  Posting a piece to the main feed is like submitting an essay to a team of editors -- very congenial and like-minded editors, but editors nonetheless.  When I first joined, I had an idea - just an idea - about writing a book on the Constitution.  That book has now been published, which I don't think would have happened without Ricochet.

The best part has been getting to know other members and contributors.  Member meet-ups are a great tradition and one that I hope continues (come to think of it, we're due for another Brooklyn meet-up soon...)

I think what you mean is that you like the result, ie that Arizona is forced to use the streamlined federal form with no additional proof required.  The constitutional question is whether the Feds can legitimately divest states of their sovereign power over voter qualifications.

Dave: not in the this situation.  The SCOTUS holding stands for the proposition that the state must go through the motions to have the Feds bless any additions to the federal voter registration form.  In a future litigation, the issue will be whether the Feds can legitimately turn down Texas' request.  The court could force the Feds to accomodate Texas's voter ID law.  But, the Court will not be required to.  There is some fine talk about states' rights in Scalia's opinion, but it is all "dicta" as they say -- not technically binding on a future court.  So SCOTUS can do whatever it wants but at least Scalia's dicta is helpful, since it was joined by 6 other justices.

Agreed that Congress can override state laws re: "times, places, and manner" of holding elections, but (as I point out above), Article I, Section 2 is the more specific provision which clearly empowers states to determine voter qualifications.

Hooray!  Ricochet at its best.

I agree with Peter: "shameless" is not too strong a word.   His WSJ piece with David Boies this morning is a pseudo-idealistic piece full of misleading statements (and mixed metaphors: "this badge of inequality must be extinguished" -- yikes).  They describe Prop 8 as "eliminating the right" to gay marriage, without mentioning that the "right" had been judicially-imposed by the California Supreme Court.  Prop 8 simply restored what the voters previously decided in Prop 22.  They claim that the growing acceptance of SSM in some way strengthens the constitutional case against Prop 8, even though both of them (Olson at least) must know that you don't interpret the Constitution based on polls.  And this morning in response to a question from Sotomayor, Olson could not articulate a coherent reason why the "marriage right" shouldn't be extended to polygamy and incest.  Olson is promoting Olson -- the Constitution is collateral damage. 

Scalia's reductio argument was unfortunate. There ought to be a world of difference between a law that criminalizes homosexual conduct and a law that simply excludes such conduct from the definition of marriage. During the Law Talk at Fordham, I think you (Richard) pointed out that the equal protection clause was originally understood as applicable to criminal law, not civil laws such as marriage. So on originalist grounds, can't we distinguish Lawrence from the question of gay marriage?

Ah, now I see your position.  Well, I agree that government involvement does tend to ruin things!

The First Amendment guarantees every clergyman's right to perform any sort of marriage, and it protects everyone's right to refer to their relationships as "marriage."  But it doesn't guarantee state recognition and subsidies for every purported "marriage."  Does your "fundamental right" extend to polygamous marriages?  Incestuous marriages? Asexual marriage?  Or in Scarlet's example above, marriage between business partners?  If not, why not? 

It is the essence of law to make distinctions; most of them are not invidious.  Assuming for the sake of argument that DOMA presents an equal protection issue (and it would be only a pseudo-issue because the equal protection clause applies only to the states), then it should be judged by rational basis scrutiny and upheld.

By the way, I should mention that not all conservative scholars have signed on to the federalism brief.  Nicohoas Quinn Rosenkranz, one of the leading constitutional scholars and a colleague of Randy Barnett at Georgetown, also argues that DOMA section 3 is consistent with federalism.   See here and here.

Equal protection does not mean that the IRS must grant every tax advantage dreamed up by the states.  The question is whether gays are a protected class  and if so, whether the traditional definition of marriage can withstand whatever level of judicial scrutiny the court decides to apply.  If there is a violation of equal protection, then the violation would not depend on a discrepancy between state and federal tax regimes. 

"Any change, at any time, for any reason, is to be deplored."

-- Duke of Cambridge

I'm afraid I don't see how that proves anything.  State and federal governments are free to create different tax regimes, even if it creates more paperwork for certain filers.